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A Third Way out of the Measurement Problem?
The dilemma for realism about quantum mechanics (QM)
Interpretations and modifications of QM proposed in response
to the measurement problem often make metaphysical
assumptions (additional variables, many worlds, collapse
dynamics) which many scientific realists find hard to accept.
Proposals without such assumptions tend towards antirealism.
In response, Ladyman and Ross (2007, 2013; henceforth “L&R”)
have proposed a (dis-)solution of the measurement problem that is
supposed to be acceptable to the realist, but still does not invoke
any problematic metaphysics.
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What Is (and Is Not) Claimed in this Talk
I do not dispute L&R’s dismissal of a simplistic
realism-versus-instrumentalism dichotomy. Admittedly, there is
much within the formalism of QM about which one can be a
realist without being committed to any realistic solution of the
measurement problem.
Nor do I criticize their position for being only a partial realism
(Esfeld 2013). (I endorse a version of partial realism myself;
see Egg 2014.)
Thesis of this talk
L&R’s dissolution of the measurement problem is not
supported by the arguments they draw from naturalized
metaphysics or ontic structural realism (OSR).
Furthermore, it undermines some specific commitments that
should be part of any kind of realism, even the minimal kind
that they themselves defend.
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Traditional Formulation of the Measurement Problem
Standard example
Basis states of the measured quantum system: |0〉S and |1〉S.
Possible final states of the measurement apparatus: |“0”〉A
and |“1”〉A.
Problem: the state a|0〉S|“0”〉A + b|1〉S|“1”〉A does not seem to
describe anything we observe, if a and b are both nonzero.
Why should we assign quantum states to the measurement
apparatus? The usual rationale is that it is supposed to be
composed of a large number of quantum particles.
L&R reject this supposition. Their ontic structural realism
(OSR) entails a “hostility to the idea that macroscopic objects
are fundamentally made of microscopic ones” (2007, 182).
But do the arguments for OSR really undermine the
formulation of the measurement problem?
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L&R’s Objections to the Measurement Problem
Objection 1: against philosophical accounts of composition
L&R criticize traditional accounts of composition for not paying
sufficient attention to how composition is treated in the various
sciences: “We have no reason to believe that an abstract
composition relation is anything other than an entrenched
philosophical fetish” (2007, 21)
Reply
The formulation of the measurement problem does not depend
on such an abstract composition relation.
Instead, the rules of composition within QM itself tell us that
the compound systems can be in superposed states just as
the elementary systems can.
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Objection 2: Doubts about fundamental objects
The historically most important arguments for OSR come from the
the indistinguishability postulate in quantum statistics and the
non-supervenience of entanglement relations. The ensuing
questions about the identity and individuality of quantum particles
suggest that there are no objects at the fundamental level.
Reply
Yes, particles are not fundamental and they may not be individuals,
but this is irrelevant to formulating the measurement problem.
The QM of composite systems is insensitive to whether the
components are regarded as individuals or not; only
cardinality matters.
Various non-fundamental systems (atoms, molecules,
fullerenes,. . . ) have been shown to come in superposed
states, and nothing more is required to formulate the
measurement problem.
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Objection 3: no particles in quantum field theory
Even the cardinality of particles becomes unstable in quantum field
theory. Particles are no longer persistent objects, but mere
excitations of quantum fields. It makes no sense to say that larger
objects are “made of” such entities.
Reply
In spite of this, particles exist in the sense of being real
patterns, identifiable at an appropriate time and energy scale
(rainforest realism; L&R 2007, Ch. 4; Ladyman 2016; 2017)
It is at this scale that the measurement problem is formulated.
Quantum field theory is irrelevant to it.
(Aside: the converse does not hold – one needs to address the
measurement problem to make sense of quantum field theory.)
QM of Macroscopic Objects “Measurement” Unanalyzed? Objective Modality
Objection 4: lack of empirical justification
“The application of the quantum formalism to macroscopic objects is not
necessarily justified, especially if those objects are importantly different from
microscopic objects, as indeed they are, in not being carefully isolated from the
environment. [From a naturalistic viewpoint], the representation of macroscopic
objects using quantum states can only be justified on the basis of its explanatory
and predictive power and it has neither.” (L&R 2007, 182)
Reply
Although there is indeed no direct empirical justification for
assigning quantum states to macroscopic objects, there is
overwhelming indirect (scientific, not just philosophical!)
justification for it.
Decoherence theory, an explanatorily and predictively
powerful part of QM routinely assigns quantum states to
macroscopic objects (the environment).
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L&R’s Positive (Bohrian) Proposal
“The predictive success of QM in this context [of measurement]
consists in the successful application of the Born rule, and that is
bought at the cost of a pragmatic splitting of the world into system
and apparatus.” (L&R 2007, 182)
The application of the Born rule is indeed successful if we
insist (with Bohr) that the apparatus needs to be described
classically in the sense of not being in any superposed state.
L&R (2013, 134) explicitly sympathize with Bohr’s early
version of the Copenhagen interpretation, which differs from
later versions by refusing to give any story about collapse of
the wave function.
The question now is whether this is compatible with realism.
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The Problem with “Measurement”
The Born rule (technically simplified formulation)
Let a quantum system be in state |ψ〉 = c1|ε1〉 + c2|ε2〉 + . . ., where
the |ε1〉, |ε2〉, . . . correspond to the possible outcomes of a certain
measurement. Then such a measurement yields the result
corresponding to |εi〉 with probability |ci|2.
The problem with the reference to probabilities of
measurement results is that it is notoriously unclear what
counts as a “measurement” (Bell 1990).
Such an imprecise notion should not occur in a basic
assumption of physics. This is why realistic versions of QM
(e.g., Everett, Bohm, GRW) seek to derive the Born rule by
giving a physical account of what it is to be a measurement.
Bohr, on the other hand, denies the need for such an account,
as L&R (2013, 134) point out approvingly.
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“Measurement” without Analysis
Admittedly, any theory has to operate with some basic notions
which are not amenable to further analysis, so why not simply
treat “measurement” as such a notion?
This works well for situations in which we all agree whether the
notion applies or not. But what about ambiguous cases, for
example, a device that displays a measurement outcome
which is not (even indirectly) observed by anyone? (“indirect
observation” in the sense of “informational connectedness”,
L&R 2007, 307)
If one insists that the Born rule does also apply to such cases,
one implicitly accepts spontaneous collapses (i.e., one of the
solutions to the measurement problem that L&R sought to
avoid).
If it doesn’t apply, this means that the presence of an observer
makes a difference to the physical process, whereas
naturalistically, an observer should be viewed as just another
measuring device.
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Verificationism vs. Realism
One could deny that there are any facts of the matter
concerning unobserved measurements, because such events
(by definition) do not make any difference to what we observe.
This is hard to square with realism, understood as a stance
that refuses to limit reality to what we can observe (or worse
still, to what we actually do observe).
L&R are quite honest about how their verificationism limits the
domain of what counts as real, but they only discuss an
example with which most realists will readily agree: “there are
no grounds for regarding the other side of [the Big Bang] as
part of reality” (2007, 309).
By contrast, many realists will think that something has gone
deeply wrong if there is no longer a fact of the matter as to how
our measurement devices behave when no one watches them.
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L&R’s Realism about Unobserved Data
Since L&R do not endorse standard realism anyway, could they not
simply accept antirealism about unobserved measurements and
still hold on to their brand of realism?
Probably not. First hint:
In their discussion of real patterns, they acknowledge that
“there are (presumably) real patterns in lifeless parts of the
universe that no actual observer will ever reach” (2007, 203).
Since patterns are “relations among data” (228), such realism
about patterns presupposes realism about data regardless of
whether they are observed or not.
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A Closer Look at L&R’s Realism: Objective Modality
L&R (2007, Subsection 2.3.2) defend a commitment to
objective modality as a crucial element of realism against van
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism.
According to L&R, constructive empiricism’s refusal to regard
beliefs about non-actual states of affairs as justified neglects
the fact that we can to some extent vary what becomes actual
and still experience that our theories accurately predict what
we observe.
Theories are always modalized in the sense that they allow for a
variety of different initial conditions or background assumptions rather
than just the actual ones, and so describe counterfactual states of
affairs. (2007, 110)
Therefore, the empiricist relies on a somewhat arbitrary
boundary when confining the content of our theories to a
description of what actually occurs.
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Arbitrariness of the Modalized Born Rule
If the Born rule is modalized in the above sense, it does give
us knowledge not only about what actually occurs, but also
about what would occur under different conditions. In that
sense, L&R’s approach to the measurement problem does not
fall prey to their charge of arbitrariness against constructive
empiricism.
However, the approach invokes a boundary that is just as
arbitrary, namely between what is observed and what actually
occurs without being observed. The Born rule is silent about
the latter set of events.
It seems that both kinds of arbitrariness ought to be equally
unacceptable to L&R. But then, they should reject their own
approach to the measurement problem in the same way as
they reject constructive empiricism.
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